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I am here today to talk about some of the security implications of Radio Frequency
Identiﬁcation. RFID tags are remotely-powered data carriers that resemble the
theft control tags that you might ﬁnd in a sweater when buying clothing from a
store. Like theft-control tags, RFID tags are powered and accessed from a dis-
tance using radio waves, but RFID tags diﬀer from theft-control tags in that they
tend to have more storage space and processing power. RFID tags have security
issues that have been exposed in the past few years. The heart of the problem is
that RFID tags don’t usually support cryptography, plus RFID application sce-
narios are usually not conducive to commonly performed security operations like
key management; in fact, many security and privacy issues that generally exist in
ubiquitous computing reappear in RFID applications speciﬁcally.
I will be discussing a new technique called Selective RFID Jamming that is
an extension of a concept called RFID Blocking, that was originated by Ari
Juels from RSA Security. However, Selective RFID Jamming has a number of
features that makes it novel. So what is Selective RFID Jamming? It is a form
of oﬀ-tag RFID access control. RFID tags can barely support on-tag security
mechanisms, which is why it is desirable to take their security management and
move it oﬀ the tags. Unlike RFID Blocker Tags, Selective RFID Jamming also
utilizes a battery powered device. In other words, a person might carry around a
small computer like a PDA or cell phone. This kind of active device has suﬃcient
resources to harness traditional security tools like cryptography access control
lists, it provides a means to introduce traditional security techniques to the realm
of RFID. Another improvement is defense against a diﬀerential signal analysis
attack that is faced by the RFID Blocker Tag. I’ll explain that a bit later.
So ﬁrst, we will delve into the diﬀerences between on-tag and oﬀ-tag access
control. With on-tag access control, tags decide themselves which queries are
authorized, and then respond accordingly (or don’t respond). With oﬀ-tag access
control, a third-party device mediates access between RFID readers and RFID
tags; in a similar manner to the RFID Blocker Tag, mediators will determine
which queries are authorized, it will jam unauthorized tag responses rendering
them unreadable by the querying reader.
On-tag RFID solutions include a kill command, sleep/wake modes, hash locks,
varying identiﬁers (called pseudonyms), and lightweight cryptography or au-
thentication, using reduced AES and NTRU. Oﬀ-tag mechanisms include Fara-
day cages (a.k.a. tinfoil), blocker tags, and external re-encryption (where RFID
B. Christianson et al. (Eds.): Security Protocols 2005, LNCS 4631, pp. 60–68, 2007.
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readers periodically re-encrypt tag data). Each of these mechanisms have their
pros and cons.
One advantage of oﬀ-tag mechanisms is that they can provide access control
to low-cost RFID tags. Low-cost RFID tags, including EPC (Electronic Product
Code) tags1, should be cheap enough that you can embed them in everything.
This allows tags to be found in a wide variety of real-world objects like consumer
items, money, passports, drivers licences, and other identiﬁcation cards. For low-
cost items (e.g. a can of tuna ﬁsh), RFID tags should be suﬃciently cheap that
the incremental cost of the tag will not eliminate the proﬁt margin on the tagged
item. In other words, low cost is essential for making RFID-based computing
possible, and the “ten cent tag” is a commonly cited goal.
High cost RFID tags may or may not oﬀer privacy protection, at the discretion
of the manufacturers. One example of high-cost RFID tags are subdermal RFID
tags called Verichips2. Trend-conscious clubgoers in Barcelona and Rotterdam
get these Verichips implanted into their arms, just below the shoulder. They
use these chips to pay for their drinks, and access the VIP areas and hot tub;
it is supposed to be quite the thing to do. But unfortunately, Applied Digital
designed Verichips to rely upon obscurity for security and privacy protection,
based upon their “proprietary readers”. If an RFID tag manufacturer neglects
to put security on their tags, the consumer needs other RFID security/privacy
options. This underscores the utility of oﬀ-tag access control.
RFID blocker tags are the best-known example of oﬀ-tag access control. How-
ever, because they are implemented on an RFID tag, they are subject to all of
the limitations of RFID tags, including power limitations, storage limitations,
and reliability problems (an RFID tag incorrectly orientated with the reader
will not even power-up let alone enforce access control. The blocker tag works
by abusing the RFID reader’s singulation protocol, that is invoked when there
are multiple RFID tags in the interrogation ﬁeld. Like several other kinds of
broadcast media, some RFID tags use a “tree-walk” singulation algorithm to
resolve tag collisions. Here is an example: RFID readers may query all tags that
begin with a ’1’. If the reader receives a collision, it then continues by querying
all tags that begin with a ’10’. If that collides, it queries again looking for tags
beginning with ’100’. The RFID reader continues in this fashion, increasing its
mask length until it resolves the collision. Simply put, the RFID blocker tag
interferes with this process by simulating collisions at every step of the way – it
prevents readers from ﬁguring out which tags are present by causing a full tag
id namespace traversal.
Our technique of Selective RFID jamming was inspired by the RFID Blocker
Tag, but it deviates from it in a number of ways. First of all, it uses a battery
powered device, so it does not face the restrictions of a power-limited RFID
tag. We are testing Selective RFID Jamming on a platform called the RFID
Guardian, that we are currently developing together with the Delft University
of Technology and Philips. The RFID Guardian is a battery powered portable
1 See www.epcglobalinc.org
2 See www.verichipcorp.com
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device that leverages two-way in-band RFID communications. People have pre-
viously suggested managing RFID security with a Wi-Fi or Bluetooth PDA,
which is a ﬁne idea if you assume every cash register checkout will have Wi-Fi
or Bluetooth communications available. However, this will often not be real-
istic, and so the RFID Guardian exclusively uses RFID protocols to conduct
its security operations. More speciﬁcally, the RFID Guardian acts like both an
RFID reader and an RFID tag emulator (using 13.56 MHz RFID, and ISO-15693
compliant).
For convenience purposes, we believe that the RFID Guardian can be best
implemented in existing available personal devices, like PDAs and cell phones.
Since Nokia has already put some RFID-enabled cell phones on the market, we
do not believe that our vision is far-fetched.
Since it is battery-powered, the RFID Guardian can then perform any number
of standard security protocols with RFID readers, (on the behalf of resource-
limited RFID tags) which may include symmetric or public key security, and
which could involve entire PKIs (if deemed necessary). In other words, the RFID
Guardian provides traditional security tools for a non-traditional application
scenario (RFID).
Because the RFID Guardian is battery-powered, it also has more than ade-
quate memory for storing possibly complex access control policies. In contrast,
RFID Blocker Tags might only have 1K bits of space for a security policy, which
severely limits its possible complexity.
Thirdly, with RFID Blocker Tag approach you are likely to end up with not
one but many security policies, because each tag has its own policy. It would be a
big nightmare to keep these policies updated, and when tags have been deployed
you will need updates to take care of the 50% of the tags that will be lost or
destroyed. If you use a centralised device that manages the security of the tags
within the radio range, you know at least that the security of the tags in near
proximity (perhaps 1 meter) are going to be taken care of. Non-mobile RFID
Guardians can also be placed in speciﬁc locations, to create zones of protection
for RFID tags in speciﬁc areas (like at home).
Tuomas Aura. So you can have your mobile phone switch to shoplifting mode?
[Laughter]
Reply. Indeed, but it’s not the only (or necessarily the easiest) way to shoplift.
Another disadvantage of localizing RFID in individual RFID tags is that you
are increasing the complexity and price of every single tag. This means if you
have a thousand tags, you have a thousand implementations of the same access
control mechanism. In contrast, with Selective RFID Jamming, you indeed have
to purchase the device (which is a certain ﬁnancial overhead), but then it can
protect thousands of very low-cost RFID tags. So for applications where cost is
a show-stopping factor, like supply chain management, centralizing the access
control infrastructure is the best approach.
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Matt Blaze. So the model is that, I have my phone and anything within RFID
range of the phone is protected?
Reply. Yes.
Matt Blaze. So it’s not tied to individual tags?
Reply. No.
Matt Blaze. So presumably the model is, I would be required to turn this
device oﬀ as soon as I walk into a store, because as soon as I walk up to the cash
register their systems are going to stop working.
Reply. Well not necessarily. This is the reason why our mechanism is called
selective RFID jamming, and that’s actually exactly what I’m about to discuss
in my next slide.
Matt Blaze. So it is tied to an individual device?
Reply. Yes. So this is where we get into the whole access control part. Now
this is going to look really familiar. You have block and pass access control lists,
sources, and targets. Just like in a network packet ﬁlter. Here the target is a list
called MYTAGS, which consists of a list of RFID tags that my RFID Guardian
knows belongs to me. The purpose of this list is to make the distinction between
jamming queries that are directed towards your tags, as opposed to queries
directed towards tags that don’t belong to you.
The targeted RFID tag IDs are extracted from the incoming RFID query, and
this id value (which may or may not be in the MYTAGS list) is compared to
the ACL to determine whether or not it is authorized; if not, the tag response
is jammed on its way back to the RFID reader.
Determining the origin of the RFID query has to be handled a diﬀerent way.
The current RFID protocols do not oﬀer room for a source address, and if there
one were available, it would be just as easily-spoofed as IP addresses are. So the
question is: how do you determine where an RFID query is coming from? The
answer is that. Unfortunately, the RFID Guardian won’t usually know where a
query originates from, but in a small minority of the cases the RFID Guardian
might encounter a “cooperative” RFID reader. For example, you might want
your RFID tags to have more lenient permissions at home, since it is a trusted
environment. In this case, you might install some special backend software on
your RFID reader that cooperates with the RFID Guardian (the RFID reader
hardware does NOT require modiﬁcation for this). You could do this for the
RFID reader at home, or at your mother-in-law’s house. The local supermarket
could also oﬀer this as a service. However, keep in mind that while a select
number of environments will have RFID readers that actively cooperate with
the RFID Guardian, the grand majority of RFID readers will not be either
helpful or even aware of what is going on. For RFID readers that are unknown,
there should be some default settings in the access control policy.
Here’s a basic example. If the RFID Guardian detects a query that targets
your RFID tags, you may want to suppress the tag responses. However, if you
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happen to be at home, then you may allow the queries responses. If you are
at Wal-Mart, you could possibly use either pre-exchanged keys or a PKI to
authenticate the RFID readers. You can grant authorized read/write permissions
if necessary. And for the rest, the RFID Guardian tries to disrupt the workings
of the nearby systems as little as possible.
Ben Laurie. So what you’re saying is if I want to read your tags I can stand
near you in Wal-Mart with my RFID reader. I let you authenticate and then I
read your tags.
Reply. That question actually leads us to the issue of authenticated sessions.
Once a reader authenticates itself, it needs a way of determining which RFID
queries originate from it (and hence are probably allowed). Source authentication
is not currently part of RFID protocols, but we’re currently taking a look at doing
this one layer higher.
Frank Stajano. You mention MYTAGS a lot, but there is no inherent associ-
ation between me writing this policy and the tags being mine.
Reply. Well the RFID Guardian manages the association between RFID tags
and the owner of the RFID Guardian by performing periodic queries to ﬁnd
out what tags are nearby. The RFID Guardian can correlate the results of these
queries over time to determine which tags are “aﬃliated” with you (either know-
ingly or unknowingly). In such a way, the RFID Guardian maintains a dynamic
MYTAGS list. It needs to be this way anyways, because you will not necessarily
know what tags you will own at the time that you’re writing the policy.
Frank Stajano. So you’re not even telling your guardians what your tags are?
Reply. There’s several ways that you can establish the “ownership” of RFID
tags. At home you might have an RFID system that can backup and synchronize
ownership information with the RFID Guardian every night. You can also “ac-
quire” new RFID tags from a store, for example when you are going through an
RFID automated checkout. While the RFID reader performing the queries nec-
essary for purchasing your items, the RFID Guardian can glean the purchased
tag numbers directly from the queries. Friendly “Guardian-aware” RFID read-
ers might even send explicit ownership information as part of the purchasing
procedure. (After authentication, of course.)
However, for tags that are added covertly (e.g. an attacker drops an RFID tag
in your handbag), then the only way that you can discover it is by correlating
periodic RFID queries. This may happen when you get home at the end of
the day, when you discover that you now have one RFID tag than that same
morning (that wasn’t explicitly added to the ownership list). The frequency
of these periodic queries represents a trade-oﬀ between privacy, accuracy, and
battery power.
Frank Stajano. You are talking here about how to automatically discover which
tags are yours, but my point was a slightly diﬀerent one which is that I as a
malicious other person can pretend that, for example, your watch is one of my
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tags and I can tell my Guardian to jam it. In such a way, you can perform Denial
of Service on other people’s RFID tags. And surely the ID of the tag is not a
secret so I don’t have to be the owner of the product to jam a tag?
Tuomas Aura. No. There’s nothing to prevent that. Obviously anyone can
carry RFID tags, anyone else can jam them.
Mike Bond. It seems that in creating these RFID guardians, these high powered
portable computing platforms that are capable of impersonating any tag, that
we’re putting a tool into the hands of people which is going to destroy the entire
binding between a tag and an object, and suddenly I’ll be able to walk around
with a device and pretend I’m covered in tags if I want to, or I can jam tags
wholesale, it just seems that if you look ten years down the line when everyone’s
got this capability in their mobile phones, and they can run little programs and
do whatever they like, then, you know, what do tags mean anymore?
Reply. You’ve got a very good point.
Mike Bond. So, you know, the observation is that, I think RFID technology
does not really scale up to a proper real world environment.
Reply. Yes, well once RFID is deployed on a wider scale I think it’s going to have
more problems than just rogue RFID Guardians. People who oppose RFID tech-
nology might remove or even switch the RFID tags on objects. This leads to a sit-
uation where RFID systems have to deal with false positives and false negatives,
just like an intrusion detection system. This indeed cheapens the entire RFID in-
frastructure, if you cannot believe the information that you get from it.
Mike Bond. And you can do it all with your mobile phone, you don’t need to
actually hack out the tags from your clothes?
Reply. The RFID Guardian, like a lot of tools, has both good uses and bad
uses. However, quite frankly if I don’t build this kind of an RFID tag emulator,
somebody else probably will.
Mike Bond. I think its a good tool. [Laughter]
Matt Blaze. It seems like the threat model here is kind of ill-deﬁned because
we don’t really know how the tags are going to be used or how they can be
misused. One of the problems getting the most attention is RFID tags that
continue to exist well beyond their necessary lifetime. If they’re intended for the
supply chain to the consumer, once they reach the consumer, they should die
at that point. But they don’t, they’re still around. They can be read, and an
attacker can abuse that to ﬁgure out where a person has been walking around,
and for all sorts of applications that they weren’t originally intended for. That
seems like a small subset of the overall problem space, and a solution to that
problem seems relatively straightforward, relative to this general solution that
you described. However, the RFID tags in my passport must continue to exist
because I want to be able to go in and out of other countries without getting
strip searched or whatever they do, when you don’t have one. So if you take out
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the supply chain RFID tags that can just be destroyed before they get to the
consumer, are you left with a problem that requires this kind of generality, and
this kind of centralised device. How many of these other remaining RFID tags
am I going to be walking around with?
Reply. Quite a few, perhaps. Let’s say you buy a box of cream spinach and it has
an RFID tag. In the glorious world of ubiquitous computing, a showcase example
is the RFID-enabled microwave that reads the data oﬀ the box of spinach, to
determine the cooking times. There are also similar projects with RFID-enabled
washing machines that warn you when you put your red sweater in with your
white socks, and it can automatically determine that your load of laundry re-
quires a low temperature, no bleach. Automating the returning of products to a
department store is another proposed use for non-deactivated RFID tags. Peo-
ple may want these tags for their value-added features, so it’s not necessarily a
matter as simple as killing all RFID tags at the checkout. That is why, in the
long run, we need some kind of a solution that allows us to both protect our
privacy, and preserve a bit of the functionality is promised by the visionaries
behind RFID technology.
Matthew Johnson. Even if you’ve only got an RFID passport it is still useful
to be able to jam it so you can verify it is a government passport if you’ve got a
PKI infrastructure because then you can verify that its a government passport
reader that is probing it, and you can block other requests.
Audience. So this is related to the problem of context with the RFID tags, so
if I’m in Wal-Mart, I want Wal-Mart to be able to read Wal-Mart tags, not any
of my tags. I don’t want them doing marketing research as I walk through the
checkout.
Reply. Exactly. You can sometimes conﬁgure your access control lists to ﬁlter
blocks of RFID tags IDs, the same way you can ﬁlter blocks of IP addresses.
For example, very much resemble the Class A, Class B, Class C, and Class D IP
addresses. And if some blocks of EPC codes are associated with Gillette Razors
or feminine garments, then I can block all of these things. Wal-Mart would
also probably have its own manufacturer code, and the product might have a
distributor code, item code, and unique item code. You can ﬁlter access to RFID
tags, based upon any of these criteria.
Audience. But then you have the same problem you have with IPs which is
the company gets taken over, and you didn’t trust the new company who owns
it, and so you start using other tag IDs so you’ve got exactly the same problem
down the line.
Reply. This is why the management of the RFID tag access control lists could
be a problem, just like management of network access control lists.
George Danezis. But if you assume that the RFID tags will be used for high
level things like washing socks and cooking spinach, then you have a much bet-
ter ability to actually identify which tags are yours, which tags should not be
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revealed, which tags are sensitive. If you assume that, you also can assume from
a security point of view that you have much richer information to make decisions.
Reply. As in much of ubiquitous computing, the context of the RFID Guardian
owner tends to be fuzzy and ill-deﬁned. Can the fact that your RFID tag is
spinach or a sock help you make access control right decisions and is there a
methodical way to represent all of this, and to gain all this context information
at the right time? Maybe. However, we would much prefer to keep our idea of
context as simple as possible,. However, it’s potentially open-ended what context
you can store and respond to. It is an entire subﬁeld in itself, actually. But you’re
right that context can be useful if you know how to harness it correctly.
Matt Johnson. But on the other hand, other readers should not be able to
query that same context, like the manufacturer and the model of whatever it is
you’re wearing.
Reply. Context in this case should help determine the amount of access that
will be granted to that reader. If singulation starts occuring in the proximity of
sensitive articles, than the RFID Guardian might start jamming singulation at
that moment. All of this can be represented as a policy.
Audience. But that means that you’ll jam anybody else around you if you have
some kind of clothing?
Reply. One of the big unresolved issues here is the denial of service, because
our system has the potential to harm its environment, by interfering with other
RFID systems. This may even cause legal problems. But our hope is that, if you
make the jamming procedure selective enough, we’ll be able to prevent interfering
with the RFID systems around us.
Another disadvantage of the RFID Guardian is that it is a single point of
failure. If somebody steals your Guardian, you’ve got a problem. We think it’s a
good idea to use PIN codes to lock the user interface, so we can provide at least
some kind of a barrier against attackers extracting the information from stolen
RFID Guardians. However, once the device is physically in the attacker’s hands,
well you have problems anyways. Another precaution is to store as little data in
your RFID Guardian as possible. For example, your RFID Guardian might only
want to keep the key information for tags that were present when you left the
house that morning. This minimizes the consequences of losing your Guardian.
Another problem is RFID readers with massively directional antennas. In
other words, an RFID reader with a big Yagi antenna will perform its query
silently to the RFID Guardian. Unfortunately, the RFID Guardian can’t enforce
what it can’t hear. Quite frankly, I’m not sure what we can do to solve this. At
least it’s a comfort that the attacker is going to look pretty silly walking around
with that big antenna.
Frank Stajano. What do you mean you can’t even hear a query?
Reply. Since the radio waves are directional, the RFID tag would be able to
hear it, but the RFID Guardian (in a diﬀerent location) wouldn’t be able to
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hear the query. And if the RFID Guardian cannot hear the original RFID query
because it’s so directional, it has no way of determining if it is unauthorized,
and stopping it. However, for this attack to work, the attacker needs to know
the exact location of the RFID tag that it is querying.
Mike Bond. If you were able to put tags to sleep, then maybe the solution is
when the tags come into the range of the RFID Guardian, they can fall asleep
and then the device just pretends to be the tag until they are released again.
Reply. Yes, deﬁnitely. What I’ve discussed today (the Selective Jamming) is
only one fraction of the total functionality that you can actually implement on
an RFID guardian. In July, I will be presenting a paper at the ACISP Con-
ference3, that also discusses topics like context-based tag activation and deac-
tivation. This may even be preferable to doing Selective Jamming, assuming
that sleep/wake functions are available on your RFID tags, because of Selective
Jamming’s possible legal issues. So you’re right.
3 Melanie Rieback, Bruno Crispo, and Andrew Tanenbaum. RFId Guardian: A
Battery-Powered Mobile Device for RFID Privacy Management. (Australasian Con-
ference on Information Security and Privacy - ACISP, July 2005).
